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SECURITIES LAW
GERALD L. FISHMAN*
THE PURPOSE OF this article is to summarize the pronouncements
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the
area of securities law during the past year. The cases hereinafter dis-
cussed will deal with the definition of a security, what is a public of-
fering of securities, the applicable statutes of limitations with respect
to securities law fraud actions, substantive conduct amounting to securi-
ties law fraud and certain issues of damages and liability for violation of
reporting requirements.
In recent years securities law practice has burgeoned into a vast
and complicated area of the law, spawning specialists who, notwith-
standing their immersion into the intricacies of federal and state securi-
ties laws, find it difficult to keep abreast of all the judicial decisions,
administrative interpretations and other requirements of a multitude of
regulatory agencies which directly affect practice in the field. Treat-
ises,' looseleaf services, ' and periodicals3 now abound. An adequate
discussion of developments in securities law requires more than a sum-
mary article concerning selected decisions of one federal circuit. Nev-
ertheless, it is hoped that such a summary article will serve a useful
purpose in aiding the reader to review a manageable section of devel-
opments in the field.
DEFINITION OF SECURITY
Since SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,4 focus on whether a particular
transaction or set of financial facts fits the definition of security in the
statutory context has become important in securities litigation. During
this past year, a district court in the Seventh Circuit addressed itself
to this issue, relying in part on prior pronouncements of the court of
* Partner in firm of Sachnoff Schrager Jones & Weaver, Ltd., member of the
Illinois Bar; J.D., Northwestern University.
1. See generally Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION (2d ed. 1961).
2. E.g., CCH weekly publication FEDERAL SEcURITLEs LAW REPORTER.
3. E.g., BNA weekly publication SECURITIES REGULATION AND LAW REPORT.
4. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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appeals.5 In Stevens v. Woodstock, Inc.,6 the plaintiffs claimed that
they were induced to deposit large sums of money with the defendants
who were brokers in commodities futures. Ness, an individual defend-
ant, allegedly represented that profits would result from the defendant's
efforts in trading commodities futures. The corporate defendants alleg-
edly conspired with Ness to make unauthorized transactions on com-
modities futures markets from the commingled funds of the plaintiffs
such that at any given time it would be impossible to determine which in-
dividual's money was being used to consummate a given transaction.
As a result of this conduct, Stevens claimed a loss of the entire amount
he deposited, which was in excess of $150,000. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that their commingled brokerage accounts constituted invest-
ment contracts and were therefore securities subject to the protec-
tion of the federal securities laws. 7  In holding the commingled
accounts to be without the statutory definition, Judge Tone, reit-
erated the Howey holding that "the test is whether the scheme in-
volves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others."' Citing Milnarik v. M-S Com-
modities,9 the district court held that because the requirement of a
common enterprise is lacking, a discretionary trading account in com-
5. See generally Horwich & Ruder, Securities Law, 50 Cm. KENT L. REV. 362, 364
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Horwich & Ruder].
6. 372 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
7. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1971) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the 1933 Act), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a
et seq. (1971) (hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act), contain substantially similar
definitions of "security." Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act states:
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest, or participation in any profit shar-
ing agreement, collateral trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investmeent contract, voting trust certificate, certif-
icate of deposit for a security, fractional and undivided interest in oil, gas, or
other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act states:
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement or in any
oil, gas or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral trust certificate, preor-
ganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a 'security'; or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange or bankers' acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof, the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Section 3(a)(11) of the 1934 Act defines the term "equity security" for purposes of the
1934 Act to include what are commonly known as convertible equity securities.
8. 328 U.S. at 301.
9. 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
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modities futures is not a security. The court reasoned that there was
no common enterprise in Stevens since the plaintiffs by their own
admission stated that the accounts were commingled on an unauthor-
ized basis. Without a common purpose, there could be no common
enterprise and hence, no security.
Whether the result in Stevens is correct is open to some question.
Certainly the decision is based upon a literal reading of statutory defini-
tions. Different results have been reached by other courts using simi-
lar analyses. I ° Unfortunately, this lack of predictability on the thresh-
old issue of what is a security is bound to continue, and the pervasion
of the securities laws into various areas of commerce will mean more
difficult questions to be considered by the securities bar.
WHAT IS A PUBLIC OFFERING
Nowhere in the federal securities laws can one find a definition
of what specifically is to be deemed a "public offering". This causes
concern to securities lawyers since offerings of securities in interstate
commerce must be registered under the 1933 Act" unless they are ex-
empt from registration as transactions by an issuer not involving any
"public offering",' 2 or are securities or transactions exempt under other
provisions of statute.
In SEC v. Dolnick," an enforcement action was brought against
an individual who allegedly participated in the distribution of unregis-
tered Pig'n Whistle securities from November 1968 to June 1970 by
mailing the common stock and convertible debentures and by selling
such securities through prospectuses. According to the findings in the
district court, the defendant Dolnick knew that Pig'n Whistle shares he
pledged to banks from May 1969 to January 1970 were neither regis-
tered nor exempt from registration. Dolnick sold some of the pledged
shares of Pig'n Whistle in the over-the-counter market to cover his
loans and was held to be a "statutory underwriter."' 4  As such, the
10. E.g., Maheu v. Reynolds Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Berman v.
Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77aet seq. (1971).
12. Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides:
The provisions of Section 5 [requiring registration] shall not apply to-
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.
13. 501 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1974).
14. Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act defines the term "underwriter" to mean:
Any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates
or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates
or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwiting of any such under-
taking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest is limited to
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court of appeals held that Dolnick was engaged in a distribution of se-
curities which, had they been sold by the issuer Pig'n Whistle, would
have required registration. In holding Dolnick to be engaged in a
distribution of unregistered securities, the court stated:
A sale of these 500 shares in the over-the-counter market by the
issuer would have constituted a "public offering" within Section
4(2). This is so because whether an offering is public does not
depend on how many shares are offered, but whether the buyer has
need for the protections of the Act. By the same token, the sale of
these shares by an intermediary like Dolnick was a 'distribution'
within Section 2(11).15 (emphasis supplied)
This test is a broad one requiring not a minimal amount of thought
and consideration by the securities law practitioner in advising his
clients when the potential of a public offering exists. This issue will
undoubtedly occupy the securities bar unless a more objective, work-
able definition of "public offering" is legislatively formulated.16
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Rule lOb-517 promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 8 which deals with manip-
ulative and deceptive conduct in connection with the purchase or sale
of a security has been the breeding ground for most federal securities
laws litigation. Neither the rule nor the statutory section under which
a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and cus-
tomary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in this paragraph the term
'issuer' shall include, in addition to an issuer, any person directly or indirectly
controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person under direct or indirect
common control with the issuer.
15. 501 F.2d at 1282. See also SEC v. Ralston-Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
16. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974) (SEC Rule 146 attempted to remedy this con-
fusion.
17. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1971), promulgated in 1942. The rule states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artiface to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1971).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public intierest or for the protection of investor$,
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it is promulgated deals with the time frame in which a private action
may be brought for violation of the rule's provisions. Thus, federal
courts have looked elsewhere for an appropriate period of limitations.
In Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc.,"0 the Seventh Circuit held that
where an action is brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Illinois is the forum state, the district court should apply the three-year
statute of limitations found in the Illinois Securities Law of
1953.20 This has been termed the "resemblance test". During the
past year, the court of appeals again had occasion to address itself to
issues concerning the statutes of limitations with respect to actions un-
der rule 1Ob-5.
In Hupp v. Gray,21 the plaintiff filed his original complaint in Sep-
tember, 1971 seeking damages from Gray, an individual, and A.G.
Becker & Co., a broker-dealer. From May 1, 1965 to January 10,
1966, Hupp made a number of purchases of shares of stock in the Var-
iable Annuity Life Insurance Company of America (Valic) through his
stockbroker, Gray, who was employed by A.G. Becker. The plaintiff
alleged that he was induced to make such purchases based on material
misrepresentations made to him by Gray. The price paid by Hupp for
the Valic stock ranged from $24.75 per share to $47.00 per share. In
the weeks after the plaintiff's last purchase at $47.00 per
share, the market price of Valic stock began to drop. Thereafter, in
March 1967, the plaintiff sold his Valic shares through a different bro-
ker-dealer for approximately $17.50 per share. The plaintiff claimed
that he discovered Gray's alleged misrepresentations and omissions by
accident in August, 1970, especially a representation with respect to
the pre-eminence of Valic in the variable insurance industry. In af-
firming the district court dismissal of the action as being time-barred,
the court of appeals held that the discovery of certain misrepresenta-
tions in August 1970 with respect to transactions completed in 1967
did not toll the statute of limitations since the equitable doctrine of
fraudulent concealment could not be applied to the factual circum-
stances of the plaintiffs situation.
This court recognized in Parrent -that the statute of limitations in a
Section 10(b) action may be tolled by the 'equitable doctrine' of
fraudulent concealment. In order to invoke this doctrine, however,
the plaintiff must have remained ignorant of the fraud, 'without
any fault or want of diligence or care on his part.' It is well estab-
19. 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.13D (1973).
21. 500 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1974).
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lished that a plaintiff may not merely rely on his own unawareness
of the facts of law to toll the statute. The plaintiff, rather, has the
burden of showing that he 'exercised reasonable care and diligence
in seeking to learn the facts which would disclose the fraud.' That
statutory period [does] not await appellants' leisurely discovery of
full details of the alleged scheme. 22
The court noted that even a wholly unsophisticated investor should
have realized by March 1967 when the shares purchased were sold at a
substantial loss, instead of at a substantial profit as represented by the de-
fendant broker, that something had gone awry. In light of this, and the
fact that the plaintiff sold his shares through a broker other than the de-
fendant, the court found that the plaintiff had ample opportunity and no-
tice that something was wrong and yet he did nothing about it. While the
court acknowledged that a fiduciary relationship between broker and cus-
tomer should be considered in determining whether a plaintiff has exer-
cised due diligence, the court held that where a reasonable person would
have been put on notice by information reasonably available to him,
this would far outweigh the fiduciary relationship factor.23
In Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,24 an action emanating from the
fraudulent securities schemes described in detail in SEC v. First Se-
curities Co. of Chicago,25 the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant
Ernst & Ernst, a certified public accounting firm, was negligent in au-
diting First Securities Co. of Chicago, thereby aiding and abetting the
rule lOb-5 violations since, it was contended, had Ernst & Ernst duly
executed its audit of First Securities, the fraudulent schemes would
have been uncovered or prevented. The trial judge held that the ap-
plicable three-year statute of limitations had run in view of the fact that
Ernst & Ernst's last audit was filed in December 1967 and the first com-
plaint in plaintiffs' actions were not entered until February 1971. In
the district court, the plaintiffs urged that the equitable doctrine of
fraudulent concealment prevented the bar of the statute of limitations
from beginning to run until the fraud was discovered in June 1968.
The trial court rejected this tolling of the statute, holding that there
was no fraudulent concealment by Ernst & Ernst. In reversing the trial
court on this issue, the court of appeals held that Ernst & Ernst is to
22. Id. at 996. See also Klein v. Bower, 421 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1970); Bailey v.
Glover, 88 U.S. 342 (1874); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1969); Laundry
Equipment Sales Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 334 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
23. 500 F.2d at 997.
24. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974).
25. 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1972). For a valuable analysis of the First Securities
litigation, see Horwich & Ruder, supra note 5, at 377.
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be charged with the negligent facilitation and implementation of the
fraud. Moreover, commented the court, the First Securities defend-
ants, through their efforts in concealing the underlying fraud, effect-
ively cloaked and concealed the alleged negligent facilitating conduct
of Ernst & Ernst and, in the judgment of the court, the plaintiffs could
avail themselves of the equitable tolling doctrine. That defendant Ernst
& Ernst should be charged with negligence was determined by the
court after a lengthy analysis of the standards and principles of auditing
and accounting, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this sum-
mary. Based on those standards, Ernst & Ernst, as experts in auditing
and accounting, were held to be negligent in performing their auditing
function, as a reasonable man could not have discovered their
negligent facilitation of the fraud in First Securities until after the sui-
cide of Nay, the principal architect of the fraudulent scheme. This re-
sult is fully consonant with the court's decision in Hupp. It is both
clear and fair that the person claiming a tolling of the applicable statute
of limitations be required to make a showing that no factual circum-
stances would have indicated, or even suggested, that a fraud was being
concealed. In Hupp, such a catalytic factor was available for all to see
in the form of the public market price. In Hochfelder, however, the
fraudulent concealment was negligently aided and abetted by defend-
ant Ernst & Ernst, an expert upon whose practices and procedures the
plaintiffs were entitled to place substantial reliance. There was no
way, but for the precipitous suicide of Nay, for the plaintiffs to discover
the fraudulent concealment. The court was thus consistent in its ap-
proach to the use of the equitable tolling doctrine.
SUBSTANTIVE CONDUCT AMOUNTING TO SECURITIES
LAW FRAUD
During the past year the court of appeals dealt with substantive
determinations of securities law fraud as well as with what has come
to be known as secondary liability under the securities laws. Second-
ary liability generally means liability which may result from another's
violation of the federal securities laws. 26
In Burns v. Paddock,'2 7 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had
26. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), was probably the first case from which liabil-
ity for aiding and abetting another's securities laws violation came to be accepted as an
appropriate remedy. For a comprehensive discussion of aiding and abetting see Ruder,
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases, 120 U. PENN. L. REV. 597 (1972).
27. 503 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1974).
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occasion to deal directly with the definition of securities law fraud.
This action arose from the plaintiffs' purchase of a minority interest
in the Paddock Corporation which they were allegedly induced to pur-
chase by certain promises which the defendants did not intend to fulfill.
The complaint alleged that in making their investments, the plaintiffs
relied upon the following oral promises: that for a period of ten years,
control of the company would be placed in the minority investors
through the use of a voting trust; that no one would be permitted to
become a director of the company unless he owned at least 1% of the
company's stock; and -that the plaintiffs would occupy certain important
offices and positions with the company and play important roles in the
management of the company. But for these promises, the plaintiffs
alleged they would not have invested in the company. The district
court dismissed the count of the complaint based upon these promises
asserting that broken promises do not rise to the level of fraud or a
violation of rule 1Ob-5. In reversing the district court's dismissal, the
court of appeals stated:
Where a promise is made with the intention of not keeping it, there
is a scheme or artifice to defraud. This court has specifically
adopted the rule that a promise made with a deceptive intent vio-
lates the Securities Act. The law has been long established that a
scheme to defraud may consist of suggestions and promises as to
the future when not made in good faith but with deceptive intent.28
The court further stated that there were sufficient allegations of the
plaintiffs' reliance on the promises to withstand a motion to dismiss.
Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,2 9 sets forth the court's standard for
stating a claim of liability for aiding and abetting solely by inaction re-
sulting in liability under rule lOb-5. The court noted that its test for
aiding and abetting liability requires a flexible standard of liability
which should be amplified according to the particularities of each case.
Accordingly, where, as here, it is urged that the defendant through
action as well as inaction has facilitated the fraud of another, a
claim for aiding and abetting is made on demonstrating: (1) that
the defendant had a duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was a bene-
ficiary of that duty of inquiry; (3) the defendant breached the
duty of inquiry; (4) concommitant with the breach of duty of in-
quiry the defendant breached a duty of disclosure; and (5) there is
a causal connection between the breach of duty of inquiry and dis-
closure and the facilitation of the underlying fraud; that is, ade-
28. Id. at 23. See also Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896);
United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607, 610 (7th Cir. 1964).
29. 503 F.2d 1100.
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quate inquiry and the subsequent disclosure would have led to the
discovery of -the underlying fraud or its prevention. 30
In reversing the district court and remanding the case for trial, the court
of appeals held that the plaintiffs did state a claim of aiding and abet-
ting a rule I Ob-5 violation under the above elements.
The court in Hochfelder went into a detailed analysis of the
standard and duty of care of accountants and auditors in the perform-
ance of their expert services. The court found that such standards
were not met by defendant Ernst & Ernst. One of the contentions of
the defendant was that the plaintiffs should be estopped from asserting
a claim against the accounting firm by reason of audit confirmations
which were signed by the plaintiffs and returned to the defendant.
While the court concurred that estoppel is properly asserted as an af-
firmative defense to a claim of aiding and abetting a rule 1 Ob-5 viola-
tion,31 the court held that it cannot say as a matter of law that the facts
surrounding the confirmations would estop the plaintiffs in this case.
It is a rule of fundamental fairness whereby a party is precluded
-from -benefiting from his own inconsistent conduct which has in-
duced reliance to the detriment of another. That is, where a plain-
tiff has, with knowledge of the facts, initially conducted himself in
a particular fashion, he cannot thereafter assume a posture incon-
sistent with such conduct to the detriment of a defendant who has
acted in material reliance upon that conduct. Applying the estop-
pel rule to the instant case, if plaintiffs knew they were to report
the escrow accounts as an exception on the confirmation and failed
to do so, they ought not be heard to complain of Ernst & Ernst's
failure to uncover or prevent the fraudulent escrow scheme, for the
inference is strong that disclosure by plaintiffs to Ernst & Ernst of
the existence of the escrow accounts would have led to the dis-
covery of Nay's fraudulent scheme. Whether plaintiffs knew or as
reasonable persons should have known that they were to report
the escrow accounts as exceptions on the confirmations requests
is a question to be properly discovered by the fact finder.32
The third area of substantive fraud to be discussed herein relates
to the area of churning and excessive trading by a broker in a custom-
er's account.33 In general, churning signifies in the securities business
the practice by a broker of advancing his own interest, i.e., his com-
30. Id. at 1104.
31. See generally Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir.
1962); Straley v. Universal Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1961);
Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855, 859 (2d Cir. 1956).
32. 503 F.2d at 1118. See also Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970); Hampden v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1960).
3. See, e.g., Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Pa. 1966.
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missions based on trading volume, without regard to his customer's ob-
jectives by a course of trading which is excessive in light of 'the size
and character of the customer's account. In Fey v. Walston & Co.,
Inc.,34 the court reversed and remanded a churning case on the grounds
that -the trial court had erred in limiting the cross examination of -the
plaintiff customer which was designed to shed further light on her trad-
ing sophistication and her investment requirements or objectives. The
plaintiff, a widow, testified that she had been employed since her hus-
band's death in 1956, and had been left little or no assets. In Novem-
ber 1963, she had eleven or twelve thousand dollars which she had
accumulated in part through some investments. During cross examina-
tion, it was brought out that the plaintiff had dealt on a number of oc-
casions with broker-dealers other than the defendant. While the court
held that there was substantial credible evidence supporting the verdict
of the jury in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability, the court
stated that the district court had unduly limited inquiry as to the plain-
tiffs investment requirements or objectives.
In a churning case, the independent objectives of a customer are an
important standard against which to measure claimed excessive-
ness. Certainly evidence bearing upon the experience, sophistica-
tion or trading naivete of the customer may be highly significant.
Despite the trial court's early impression that the sole question
was one of authority and plaintiff's initial testimony that the trades
in question were without her authority, some of her later testimony
supported the theory of abuse of authority through churning. The
trial court, inconsistent with evidential developments in the case
applied discriminately against the defendants from time to time its
initial erroneous view and precluded full exploration by the de-
fendants of plaintiff's continuing churning theory.35
The court noted that the trial judge's instructions somewhat obscured
the fact that liability could accrue should the securities salesman fail
to conform to the customer's objectives, but if a salesman does only
what the customer has independently in mind as an objective, has au-
thority to do so and fulfills the fiduciary duty to furnish fair advice,
the additional motive of the salesman to earn commissions does not
convert the transactions into a violation of rule lOb-5.
The plaintiff Fey relied, at least in part, upon the alleged abuse
34. 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
35. Id. at 1045. See also Booth v. Peavey Company Commodities Services, 430
F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970); Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir
1970); Newberger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Moscarelli
v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 'See generally Note, Churning by Securi-
ties Dealers, 80 HA~v. L. REv. 869 (1967).
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by her broker of a fiduciary relationship for her claim of churning of
her account. The court stated that the mere existence of a broker-
customer relationship is not proof of its fiduciary character, but on a
disputed record the issue remains one of fact. Had it been shown that
the plaintiff relied heavily upon the defendant broker with respect to
her investments rather than the trial court having limited inquiry into
her investment expertise, the issue of fiduciary relationships would
have been resolved more easily.
The question of estoppel was raised here in a manner similar to
that in Hochfelder. Here the court stated:
Mere failure to read statements and confirmation, or to object to
actions revealed therein, could not be deemed sufficient as a mat-
ter of law to establish waiver or to raise an estoppel in view of
plaintiff's theory of fiduciary relationship and related impositions
by defendants. Express consent to churning transactions would
not necessarily raise these defenses if such consent were induced
by the undue influence of a fiduciary. Indeed, it has been said
that transactions initiated by the customers themselves may be in-
dicative of churning where the trust and confidence of the customer
vests control in the broker.
The vice of churning is not to be localized within a particular
transaction. ,It is the aggregation of transactions excessive in num-
ber and effect which constitutes the gravamen of the complaint.
One consenting to a particular sale may not by that token agree
to a proliferation of similar sales, especially if dealing with a fidu-
ciary in whom there is a right to repose confidence. On the other
hand, lack of knowledge of various rights may not be supportive of,
or even germane to the claim of one who independently initiates,
or freely and fairly approves, a series of transactions which would
constitute churning if induced by an agent for fraudulent purpose. 36
Under the particular circumstances in Fey, the court of appeals
stated that it believed proper submission of the issues framed by the
complaint and the general denials would have permitted the jury to
fairly consider whether any excessive trading was attributable to the
defendants. The jury could determine if the abuse of authority or un-
due influence arose from the fiduciary relationship, or if the plaintiff
was independently motivated to -trade excessively as dictated by her
own objectives and desires. As a result, the matter was remanded for
a new trial to grant the defendants the opportunity to explore these
issues more fully before the fact finder, notwithstanding the likelihood
of some liability on the part of the defendants.
36. 493 F.2d at 1049.
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DAMAGES IN SECURITIES ACTIONS
Another issue which the court of appeals faced during this past year
was the issue of damages in securities actions. Madigan, Inc. v. Good-
man,37 was an action for alleged fraudulent misrepresentation in con-
nection with the purchase by the plaintiffs of stock of an insurance com-
pany which later failed. According to the complaint, the plaintiffs pur-
chased all the outstanding stock of Fidelity General Insurance Com-
pany from seven former shareholders in two steps, for which they paid
over three million dollars. The plaintiffs asserted that as a result of
the material misrepresentations, in addition to the loss of the purchase
price, they had expended additional sums in an effort to prevent the
insolvency of the insurance company, lost one million dollars in ex-
pected profits, incurred substantial expenses in defending lawsuits re-
sulting from their purchase of the stock, might incur substantial addi-
tional losses in connection with the insurance company related litiga-
tion and were unable to plan and conduct their financial affairs in an
orderly manner due to this litigation. Agreeing with the plaintiffs with
respect to consequential damages, the court stated that if the plaintiffs
can establish the requisite causal nexus at trial, they are entitled to recov-
er out-of-pocket consequential damages suffered as a result of holding the
insurance company stock.38  The court rejected the contention that con-
sequential damages are recoverable only if incurred while the stock was
held.
When a securities transaction causes plaintiffs to wind up with less
money than they began with, there is no reason in the policies of
the securities laws why their right to recovery should depend on
exactly when the loss was realized or on whether the loss was fully
reflected on a change in the securities price. Accordingly, capital
contributions and other expenses of attempting to save Fidelity
may be recoverable. Plaintiffs must show that each expenditure
for which recovery is sought is a reasonable effort to, e.g., minimize
plaintiffs' losses, or fulfill a fiduciary obligation to Fidelity policy
holders, or comply with the requirements of regulatory agencies.
They must also show that the danger from which Fidelity was being
saved was the pre-existing insolvency concealed by defendnats, and
that but for defendants' misrepresentations, plaintiffs would not
have made these expenditures. We also think that the $18,384
broker's commission, or finder's fee, is recoverable if, but for the
misrepresentations, it would not have been spent.39
37. 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974).
38. See also Zeller v. Bogue Electric Manufacturing Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1974).
39. 498 F.2d at 238-39,
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The court went on to say that damages which are not a direct con-
sequence of the alleged fraud would not be recoverable.
The federal rule has traditionally been that only 'out-of-pocket'
losses are recoverable in a fraud action. A defendant was bound
to make good the loss sustained, such as the monies the plaintiff
had paid out and interest and any other outlay legitimately attrib-
utable to the defendants' fraudulent conduct; but this liability did
not include -the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation. 40
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the trial court order insofar as it
denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their right to direct conse-
quential damages.
It would seem that this result is a correct one since securities law
fraud can be deemed akin to an action in tort. As the court in Madigan
noted, the plaintiffs did not allege breach of contract, rather, they al-
leged misrepresentation. If the defendants had told the truth, the
plaintiffs would have no complaint, since, had the defendants acted le-
gally, the plaintiffs would not have purchased the stock of the now de-
funct insurance company, or at least would have purchased it at a lower
price. Thus, the plaintiffs should be entitled to compensation for lost
alternative uses of their money, that is, direct consequential damages,
but not for profits that never existed.
TECHNICAL VIOLATIONS OF THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act41 requires the timely filing of a
40. Id.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1971).
(d) (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the benefi-
cial ownership of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant
to section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an insurance company
which would have been required to be so registered except for the exemption
contained in section 12(g)(2)(G) of this title, or any equity security issued
by a closed-end investment company registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940, is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 5 per
centum of such class shall, within ten days after such acquisition, send to the
issuer of the security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified
mail, send to each exchange where the security is traded, and file with the
Commission, a statement containing such of the following information, and
such additional information, as the Commission may by rules and regulations
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors-
(A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on whose be-
half the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or
to be used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or
proposed purchase price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other
consideration borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring,
holding or trading such security, a description of the transaction and the names
of the parties thereto, except that where a source of funds in a loan made in
the ordinary course of business by a bank, as defined in section 3(a) (6) of
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schedule 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission upon 'the
acquisition of 5% of the outstanding securities of an class of a corpora-
tion registered under the 1934 Act. In Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Ron-
deau,42 the defendant conceded his technical violation of this require-
this title, if the person filing such statement so requests, the names of the
bank shall not be made available to the public;
(C) if the purpose of the purchasers or prospective purchaser is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals
which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or
merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its busi-
ness or corporate structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned,
and the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly
or indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person,
giving the name and address of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings
with any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not
limited to transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option ar-
rangements, puts or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss or guaran-
ties of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of
proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or under-
standings have been entered into, and giving the details thereof.
(2) If any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the statements
to the issuer and the exchange, and in the statement filed with the Commission,
an amendment shall be transmitted to the issuer and the exchange and shall
be filed with the Commission, in accordance with such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of investors.
(3) When two or more persons act as a partnership, limited partnership,
syndicate, or other group for the purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of
securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a 'person' for
the purposes of this subsection.
(4) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any percentage of a
class of any security, such class shall be deemed to consist of the amount of
the outstanding securities of such class, exclusive of any securities of such class
held by or for the account of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer.
(5) The Commission, by rule or regulation or by order, may permit any
person to file in lieu of the statement required by paragraph (1) of this sub-
section or the rules and regulations thereunder, a notice stating the name of
such person, the number of shares of any equity securities subject to paragraph
(1) which are owned by him, the date of their acquisition and such other in..
formation as the Commission may specify, as it appears to the Commission
that such securities were acquired by such person in the ordinary course of his
business and were not acquired for the purpose of and do not have the effect
of changing or influencing the control of the issuer nor in connection with or
as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect.
(6) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to-
(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made or proposed to be
made by means of a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933;
(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which, to-
gether with all other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same
class during the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that
class;
(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer of such security;
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the
Commission, by rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt from the provi-
sions of this subsection as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having
the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as
not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection.
42. 500 F.2d 1011 (7thCir. 1974).
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ment by not timely filing a schedule 13D after having purchased 8%
of the outstanding common stock of the plaintiff corporation. The de-
fendant claimed that his failure to timely file schedule 13D was merely
a technical violation of the law which was cured by his subsequent late
filing. The purpose of the filing requirement, that of providing ade-
quate notice and information to the management and shareholders re-
garding an individual or group seeking control of a corporation prior
to a tender offer or proxy contest, was met within a reasonable -time.
Summary judgment for the defendant was reversed and the court of
appeals ordered the district court to prohibit defendant Rondeau from
voting 3 % of the outstanding shares of Mosinee Paper Corporation with
respect to any take-over, proxy contest, or vote for officers and mem-
bership in the board of directors for a period of five years. The major-
ity of the court of appeals panel felt that this injunctive decree was ap-
propriate to neutralize the defendant's violation of the act and to deny
him the benefit of his wrongdoing. In reaching this conclusion, the
majority opinion held that the purpose for the reporting requirements
of section 13(d) relates, not to the intention of the acquiring party,
but rather, to the potential to effect control.
We agree with the Second Circuit's analysis of the Act . . . that
'the purpose of Section 13(d) is to alert the market place to every
large rapid aggregation or accumulation of securities, regardless of
technique employed, which might represent a potential shift in cor-
porate control.. . .' To this observation we add what is self-evi-
dent from the language and legislative history of the Williams Act,
the reporting requirements of Section 13(d) apply regardless of the
purchasers' purpose in acquiring his shares. 43
In his dissent, Judge Pell noted:
The Williams Act by its terms does not provide any penalties for its
violation, nor does it mandate any civil remedy. While I would
not gainsay that the courts may properly fashion a remedy for a
violation of the act, I could not conceive that Congress intended the
punishment should do otherwise than fit the crime. Therefore,
assuming there was no genuine issue of material fact presented to
the district court, a separate issue which does cause me concern, I
am unable to concur in the result reached by the majority.44
Judge Pell went on to carefully reason that, indeed, the violation of
the reporting requirements did not cause irreparable harm and further
that the injunctive order punishment of the majority certainly did not
43. Id. at 1016. See also GAF Corporation v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d
Cir. 1971).
44. 500 F.2d at 1018.
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fit the crime. While the majority opinion in Mosinee is a proper effort
in attempting to further compliance with one of the myriad reporting
requirements under the federal securities laws, it would seem that un-
der the circumstances presented in the case, Judge Pell's dissent is
clearly the better reasoned and more equitable view.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while not as heavily
ladened with securities actions as, say, the Second Circuit, has over
the years been involved in many novel developments under the federal
securities laws. The cases decided by the Seventh Circuit in this area
during the past year on balance generally seem to have been consistent
with both fundamental fairness and the court's prior pronouncements.
Securities lawyers practicing within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals are generally fortunate in finding usually well
reasoned judicial decisions in the securities law area. This added
measure of relative predictability should serve the Seventh Circuit se-
curities bar well in dealings with and on behalf of its clients.
